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The issue of ethical conduct in research settings is important
and complex. As tenure-track researchers who study gendered
violence, we found Clark and Walker’s discussion provocative,
complex, and interesting. They urge researchers to attend both to the
structural dynamics of research carried out under the pressures of
tenure and promotion while advocating an ethical frame that draws
attention to the limited definition of risk or harm that animates typical
human subjects research. Victims of violence, they argue, should not
be subjected to a standardized understanding of risk. A broader
framework is needed, one which brings into conversation virtue ethics
with consequentialist and ontological frameworks. Given the
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impossible task of responding to the many points discussed by Clark
and Walker, we chose to focus on four areas. In all likelihood, these
areas of discussion reflect our own interests rather than Clark and
Walker’s, but challenged to think seriously about research ethics in
victimization studies, we attend to the following points.
First, we seek to put virtue ethics in conversation with care
ethics, in part because care ethics formed an important component of
feminist discourse during the historical period in which institutional
review boards came into being. While virtue ethics may have lost its
masculinist inflection after shedding its etymological roots,i care ethics
was explicitly seen as suited for the feminist subject. Following our
discussion of care ethics, we address the question of setting victims of
violence apart as a special class of vulnerable human research
subjects. We argue that such a designation may yield more problems
than it does solutions. Next, we turn to the violence of epistemology as
a concern in research ethics. How do we come to an ethical definition
of the research object, and to whom are we accountable? Finally, we
turn to the relation of care when carrying out ethically and
methodologically sound research projects.

Virtue Ethics, Feminism, and Care Ethics
In their paper, Clark and Walker propose widening the frame of
research ethics in victimization research by calling attention to the
applicability of a virtues based ethics theory (p. 6) to address
contemporary ethical demands that far exceed principle-based
practice. In conflict with this position, the ethics framework that guides
Western research is based on Kantian moral theory of the universal
rational subject. Embedded in principle-based research ethics, United
States Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) are charged with protecting
the rights and safety of research participants primarily based on riskbenefit analyses. As Clark and Walker state, “Principlism’s attraction is
that rule-following allows researchers and institutions to believe they
derive the benefits of rigorous, ethical thinking without needing to
actually think about ethics” (p. 10-11). Debates about ethics and
moral theory have a long history and not surprisingly, much of the
original feminist research on ethics was published in the 1980s
coinciding with the establishment of many university IRBs. Certainly,
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virtue ethicists and feminists alike have argued that ethical thinking
provides a framework to guide decision making contrary to mere rules
or regulations.
A discussion of ethical research practice with victims of violence
must attend to the vast body of work on care ethics and virtue ethics.
Feminist ethics developed in response to said universal standards of
Western epistemology, arguing against established rational-choice
frameworks based on objective/subjective binaries,
reductive/deductive reasoning, and hierarchical relationships between
the researcher and research “subject” (e.g., Gilligan 1982; Harding
1986, 1991; Harding and Norberg 2005; Noddings 1984; Smith 1987).
This tension is embodied in the Kohlbeg and Gilligan debates that drew
attention to moral decision making beyond obligation or principle.
While Kohlberg (1981) argued that ethical and moral persons act out
of universalist rights, virtues or obligations, Gilligan (1982) argued
that decision making was also based on an ethic of care, privileging
the relationship, particular, relative, and subjective over the principle,
abstract, absolute, and objective. An ethic of care is complicated and
contextual, and caring is affective rather than principled, depending on
empathy and receptiveness (Noddings 1984). Virtue ethics focus on
moral agents rather than actions, and emphasizes being and intention.
Moral character then is privileged over consequence. In more recent
literatures, ethicists have attempted to merge care ethics with virtue
ethics. Debates center on their compatibility, definitions of care as
virtue in terms of motives or consequences, relational ontology, and
theories of justice (see Sander-Staudt 2006). While a thorough review
of these debates is beyond the scope of this commentary, SanderStaudt (2006) distinguishes between the positioning of care in virtue
ethics and care ethics, the pragmatism of care, and the distinct role of
relational ontology. Ultimately, neither care ethics nor virtue ethics
eliminates moral and ethical dilemmas. Rather, they are understood as
models for researchers to draw upon in specific contexts of ethical
complexity during the research process. Further, neither care nor
virtue ethics excludes consideration of principle.
This long established scholarly debate, engaging with and
challenging research hierarchies, remains focused on abstract
principles rather than virtue or caring. Despite efforts to elucidate
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knowledge from particular standpoints (Keller 1985; DeVault 1999;
Harding 1991; Smith 1987) the regulatory effect has been to err on
the side of homogenization of the ethical approach and the research
object. In fact, IRBs position participants as the “object” of study or
the generalized “other,” assuming shared, identifiable and consistent
characteristics (e.g., defining and sampling a research population of
victims). In the next section, we explore the complications attached to
designating victims of violence as a special class of vulnerable human
subjects.

Victims of Partner Violence as a Class of
Vulnerable Human Subjects
Clark and Walker begin their call for a more broad approach to
research ethics in research on victims of violence by expressing their
concern over the lack of a specialized status of “vulnerable human
subject” for victims of partner violence (p. 3). Though they do not
explicitly argue that there ought to be such a designation in federal
research regulations, its prominence within the article suggests that
this is a serious consideration for Clark and Walker. The notion of
victims of violence, specifically victims of intimate partner violence, as
a specially designated class of vulnerable human subjects invites many
questions. Invited to adopt a virtue ethics approach towards ethical
comportment in research, we are urged to think of the character of the
moral agent (p. 6). Within a given research setting, we can identify at
least two moral agents: the researcher and the research participant.
Clark and Walker thoroughly discuss the moral agency of researchers;
hence, we turn our attention to the research participant. If we infer a
suggestion to “ontologize” the subject from Clark and Walker’s
criticism of regulatory structures grounded in deontological theories (p.
9), we can participate in the exercise of emphasizing the state of being
described as “victim.” Towards that end, the two primary questions we
will pose here address the temporality and duration of victim status
and the capacity of vulnerable subjects to consent to participate in
research.
We come to these questions by direct comparison of victims of
violence with the other classes of research subjects who carry a special
designation as vulnerable research subjects within federal regulations.
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As Clark and Walker state, these include prisoners, pregnant women,
fetuses, neonates and children. Typically, these designations are all
bound within time. That is, there is a finite window in which one is a
prisoner, a pregnant woman, a fetus, a neonate or a child. How long,
then, does the status of victim of violence inhere? Are individuals who
have experienced violence perpetually marked as victims for the
duration of their lifetimes? Or are we only referring to individuals who
are actively being victimized within an intimate partner setting at the
time of their participation in the research project? Given that many
studies are conducted in the aftermath of violence, particularly those
studies that evaluate the role of legal and clinical interventions into
violence, it seems that researchers encounter victims of violence at
various temporal “distances” from the event (or an event) of
victimization. Thus, the vulnerability of the subject would have to be
assessed and reassessed unless one assumes it as a constant. In other
words, the formula introduced by Clark and Walker would benefit from
either a temporal “co-efficient” or a periodic recalculation (p. 18).
Faced with two equally untenable options, either casting victims
in a permanent state of victimhood, or assigning a singular (temporal)
criteria for leaving behind the status of victim, it becomes immediately
apparent that classing victims of violence as a distinctive category is a
slippery task. Feminist scholars have approached the question of the
designations of “victim” from many different perspectives (Alcoff and
Gray 1993; Lamb 1999; Mardorossian 2003). When do victims become
survivors? What criteria are relevant in making this distinction? Who is
empowered to make this distinction? These questions animate the
debates over the meaning and permanence of victim status. For some,
the identifiers “victim” or “survivor” can only be self-designated (Alcoff
and Gray 1993: 262), while for others, continued deployment of the
term “victim” is seen as paternalistic and diminishing of the agency of
the subject (Lamb 1999: 9).
This points us to the question of agency of the research subject.
Turning back to Clark and Walker’s call to take seriously the moral
agency of the ethical actors in a research setting, we must consider
victims of violence as moral agents. Once again, comparing victims of
violence to other classes of vulnerable human subjects proves a useful
exercise. The vulnerability of prisoners, pregnant women, neonates,
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fetuses and children is partly understood as a diminished capacity to
consent to participate in research (Kipnis 2001; Zion, Gillam and Loff
2000: 616). Prisoners are seen as potentially coerced through the
structural conditions of imprisonment. Pregnant women may not be
attenuated to the added health risks of research, nor are they to
commit to research participation that may harm the unborn-- the
aforementioned fetuses and neonates who do not speak for
“themselves.” Children, who we view as agentive (Hlavka 2010; Prout
2000), are frequently considered to have a diminished capacity to
consent because they have not attained an adult’s faculty of reason
and thus are unable to comprehend the potential harms and
consequences that may unfold as a result of participate in research. If
we consider the victim of violence in relation to her capacity to consent
to participate in research, we see a danger in assuming that she has a
diminished or impaired capacity to consent.
If we think about the interventions that typically attend intimate
partner violence, the primary goal is often to empower the victim
(Kasturirangan 2008). In cases of sexual violence, establishing and
respecting the victim’s capacity to consent is the very crux of both
strategies to empower the victim as well as any legal case that
subsequently unfolds. A rape victim within the setting of a formal
intervention must consent to medical care and participation in the
criminal justice process. Assuming a victim’s diminished capacity to
consent to participation in research requires us to differentiate
between the victim as legal subject, medical subject, and potential
research subject, fracturing the subject in a way that may prove
epistemologically problematic in terms of our research agendas. Some
may argue that research participation does not carry with it the same
urgency and importance as accessing health care and reporting to the
police, and this is a legitimate critique. However, it is here where our
own research, respectively on children reporting sexual abuse and
adult sexual assault forensic interventions, comes to bear.
Clark and Walker point out that victims of violence may come to
have false expectations of the impact of the research in which they
participate (p. 12-13). In our own experience, we have seen false
expectations nurtured and encouraged not only by researchers, but by
the legal and therapeutic establishments. For example, rape victims
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who report to the police and undergo forensic examination are
frequently surprised with the low rates of subsequent contact with the
police department (Chen and Ullman 2010). Rather than disclose this
statistical reality to victims, legal and medical personnel will frequently
advocate and encourage victims to participate in the forensic
examination and make a police report. Is the victim in these settings
making an informed decision to consent? Within a virtue ethics frame,
researchers should not participate in the same types of false promises
in which we guarantee particular outcomes or impacts. It is impossible
to anticipate our research findings, the success or failures of our
dissemination plans, or the impact of our research. We are
accountable for making full disclosures of these uncertainties so that
research participants are empowered to make informed decisions to
opt into or out of research. Such disclosures assist the victim as moral
agent in making an informed decision. However, we think there is
harm in assuming a diminished capacity of all victims of violence to
consent—particularly in cases of sexual violence in which it is the
capacity to consent which is itself being reaffirmed.
Finally, we face the challenge that the status and characteristics
of victims, or particularly groups of victims, is frequently our research
object. In studying victims, we embark on agendas of inquiry that
query existing stereotypes or constructs of victimhood, and seek to
illuminate underlying realities as opposed to validating a priori
assumptions. Creating a regulatory designation that classes victims of
violence as vulnerable research subjects introduces an a priori
epistemological category, one which may predetermine our research
findings and ultimately lead to the non-rigorous or problematic
research findings of which Clark and Walker are deeply critical (p. 22).
These are only one of several epistemological concerns Clark and
Walker raise in their piece.

Epistemic Violence and Ethnographic Directions
Defining victims of violence as a particular class of subject is not
the sole epistemological concern impacting research on intimate
partner and sexual violence. In this section, we will address the
dangers of epistemic violence, the potential of interdisciplinary
research, and ethnographic methodologies. By addressing Stark’s
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critique of clinical research on battered women’s syndrome, Clark and
Walker present a very unsettling picture of the dangers of epistemic
violence (Spivak 1998: 280). Briefly, our understanding of epistemic
violence, drawing on Spivak’s classic example, is that of a subaltern
defined by a Western epistemology that defines and delimits the
subaltern’s ‘voice’ in a way that does not encapsulate the subaltern’s
subject position as viewed from the subaltern’s perspective. Here, both
the subaltern’s subjective position and their epistemological traditions
are marginalized. Feminist standpoint theorists have addressed a
similar range of concerns (Collins 1998; Smith 1999). Spivak does not
limit epistemic violence to the context post-colonial studies, but draws
particular attention to the vulnerability of women as research objects
(Spivak 1998: 299). Women, she argues, are even more vulnerable to
the epistemic violence of patriarchal Western constructs.
Let us now return to Clark and Walker’s innate critique of
epistemic violence in their introduction of Stark’s research. Stark
draws attention to the U.S. legal system’s evidentiary standard derived
from clinical research on battered women’s syndrome, a standard that
excludes many battered women whose presentations differ from the
clinical profile advanced by researchers (p. 25). In this example, the
narrowly defined research object, “battered women’s syndrome,”
calcifies such that it acquires an epistemic solidity that defies
flexibility, permeability and variation. Thus, a subject, the person
suffering from battered women’s syndrome, is produced through the
narrowly defined criteria that limit the ways in which battered women’s
syndrome operates within the legal system. The violence of singular
epistemic constructs extends beyond research contexts in which
research comes to bear on interventions. In research on gender
violence, ethical guidelines frequently suggest that research findings
must be faithful enough to research participant’s accounts that they
are able to recognize their own narratives within the research outputs
(Hall and Stevens 1991). This is particularly true where studies purport
to represent the voices of victims. The potential for violence arises
when victims, subjected to epistemic categories and understandings
that do not fully encapsulate their experiences, do not recognize
themselves in the research product (Mulla 2008). Thus, the battered
women’s syndrome survivors need never be denied access to this
diagnosis in court in order to be harmed. Their experiences can be
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alienated and invalidated by the process of research itself. These
undesirable outcomes are further complicated within research that
seeks knowledge of victim subjectivity and meaning-making (Das and
Kleinman 1997: 17; Kleinman 2006: 212). When the goal of a
research study is to increase understanding of victim subjectivity and
meaning-making practices, epistemic violence is both unethical and
also failed research.
Avoiding the trap of designing a research methodology that is
prone to epistemic violence is a challenge. Precision in defining our
research objects is, indeed, frequently implicit in our desires for rigor.
In our own research, how do we achieve the multi-stranded (or many
fibered) modality of inquiry advocated by those like Wittgenstein
(1957 §67 as cited in Clark and Walker)? Wittgenstein was fond of the
comparison between the life-world and weaving, and alludes to this
analogy at multiple points within the Philosophical Investigations
(1957 §362). Thus, the pursuit of knowledge about the life-world was
akin to unraveling the many fibers of a twined rope. Contrast this
approach of unraveling with treating the rope as if it were one solid
and singular object. Another analogy Wittgenstein uses within the
Investigations is that of digging in the dirt. When we pick up a shovel
to dig, he states, we could either think of ourselves as aiming to dig
until we hit bedrock or simply turning over the earth (1957 §217). It is
the second model, that of turning over the earth, that appeals to
Wittgenstein. Aiming for bedrock may result in definitive and highimpact research, but it closes the door of future inquiry by presuming
that there are no questions that ought to be pursued beyond the
immediate research agenda. As with Stark’s example of battered
women’s syndrome, such presumptions can result in a problematic and
dangerous violence whereas continued inquiry would benefit scholars,
research subjects, policy makers, and participants in the legal system.
Incorporating lessons from philosophy into the way we think
about and conduct social science research is about far more than
merely introducing a new jargon (Das 1998: 172). Philosophical
concepts do not easily translate into social science thinking. Their
potential contribution lies in helping researchers “to introduce a
hesitancy in the way in which we habitually dwell among our concepts”
(Ibid). If our approach to conducting research through a mode of
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open-ended inquiry is the first step towards introducing hesitations
that may lead to more ethical research, it has been our experience
that interdisciplinary collaboration is a second constructive area in
pursuing ethical research conduct with victims of violence. No single
discipline has a monopoly on the study of intimate partner and sexual
violence. Compelling research has been carried out by sociologists,
criminologists, anthropologists, political scientists, social workers,
psychologists, historians, and many others. Each discipline pursues
different, though often overlapping, methodologies. There are many
advantages and challenges to pursuing interdisciplinary collaboration
and research, but again, we will limit our discussion to epistemic
violence.
If the calcification and over-determination of research objects is
what we seek to avoid, interdisciplinary research can aid us in
approaching the research object through a deliberative process rather
than succumb to the convenient habit of using a priori categories.
Faced with an interlocutor who is oriented to a different epistemology
than our own, we must justify the epistemic construct with which we
are most familiar. There is also more incentive to diligently review a
broader range of literature without the excuse of only working within
one discipline, a problem to which Clark and Walker attend with great
detail (p. 20). As an anthropologist and a criminologist working within
sociological traditions, we frequently spend many frustrated hours
setting a research agenda that can be justified within both of our home
disciplines. Rather than regard this as burden, our experience has
been that these deliberative processes lead to new and interesting
approaches to the study of gendered violence in our society. For
example, we have moved away from analyses of the event of violence
itself—an epistemic object that does not easily lend itself to analysis,
nor to generalizable findings. Instead, we find ourselves working in
institutional structures that reify and validate particular experiences of
suffering violence, such as the courtroom or the forensic examination
(Mulla 2008).
A discussion of how we determine our epistemic constructs
inevitability leads to consideration of the tendency of research
structures to privilege so-called “scientific” models of research over
other models. Scientific standards dictate which studies will be
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published and which excluded (p. 27). Applied research, Clark and
Walker state, is given short shrift while clinical trials rule within
medical journals. We argue for a broader understanding of the
scientific method, one that embraces both experimental models while
valuing the observational model, particularly as it applies to human
behavior, culture and society. Observational science has a home within
ethnographic methodology, an old tradition that replaces the
certainties of the scientific experiment with the patience of longitudinal
research plans, open-ended research questions, and a density and
depth of data that can only be yielded through such long term
commitments. There are risks that come with ethnographic research—
as Stacey pointed out, in a more sustained research relationship there
are more opportunities for ethical complications (Stacey 1988). There
have been many thoughtful responses and objections to Stacey’s
regard of ethnography as problematic. What Stacey regards as
increased risk through extended contact with research participants, we
regard as increased accountability. Though short term research
commitments may yield fewer immediate ethical violations in the
interactions between researcher and research participant, in studying
gendered violence, risk does not end in the moment the research
encounter ends. Nor is the harm that may ensue limited only to the
research participant, as Clark and Walker have already demonstrated.
Thus, ethnographic models may allow for fruitful research processes
that test the stability of research findings over longer periods of time,
while engendering more reliable research objects that have withstood
the course of longer research engagements. Ethnographers would be
well-positioned to take up Clark and Walker’s challenge to “imagine
the daily life of, for example, a young woman who is being stalked, a
penniless, battered mother of three small children living in a shelter,
or a woman lying in a doorway after being raped and dumped in the
street--these images might evoke the kind of care and curiosity that
would lead to more fruitful scientific concerns embedded in a
fundamental desire to not make their lives any worse” (p. 14).
Attending to a more complete sense of the life-world of research
subjects allows researchers an informed sense of the ethical issues at
hand.
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Care as an Epistemological Cornerstone
Controversies about relations between knowledge and power in
research methods and practices have long been teased out in feminist
and social theory. Epistemological questions have included: What is
knowledge? Whose knowledge is it? Who decides what problems and
conditions are worthy of study? How is knowledge produced and
disseminated? Feminists from varying perspectives have pointed to
possible solutions including standpoint theory, mentioned earlier, and
participatory action research. Though unable to eliminate power
differentials, these methodologies work to address the power relations
between researcher and research participants and their communities.
Clark and Walker, too, invite researchers to address the ethics of the
entire research enterprise (p. 30) including the research purpose and
design, staff training and education, and research publication. From
this position, the research enterprise ought to then privilege
contextual, experientially-based knowledge and intersubjectivity
(Fonow and Cook 1991; Stanley and Wise 1993). We argue that the
moral agent must be intentional, reflexive and imaginative in a
prolonged process of ethical and moral query that attends to both
motive and to ends. She cannot be content with questions of being
and intention.
Privileging both intention and outcome embeds the entire
research process in a relational, reflexive, and at times, transformative
endeavor. Viewing this process as intersubjective problematizes how
the researcher might go about, intentionally, her scientific practice
without attending to a chorus of voices and shared meanings. Ethical
research practice will largely depend on the qualities and skills of the
researcher(s). Such skills stress interdependence and responsibility
and include respect, empathy, imagination, authenticity and as Clark
and Walker state, adaptive thinking (p. 29). Ethical practice
constitutes a host of activities not limited to: immersing oneself in the
literature; dwelling on discussions and controversies in the field (such
as calls for research on women’s violent behavior in relationships
[Renzetti 1999]; same-sex relationship violence; and men as victims
of partner violence); anticipating potential ethical conundrums during
the course of research and possible responses; encouraging and
developing the reflexivity necessary to question the consequences of
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one’s position and biography in relation to others, the research
environment, and the broader academic enterprise; engaging in the
dialogic exercise of learning from the reflexive research practices of
others; and allowing participants and their embodied communities to
take part in the research process including informing the research
problem and process to be studied (e.g., participatory action
research), informing staff training and education (e.g., Campbell et al.
2009) as well as the final research product.
Shifting focus away from a hierarchical, detached and objective
relationship to one of virtue, care and connectedness requires
flexibility. Surely we are all aware of the extent to which the
researcher is never in full control of her research process, participants,
or environment. With new knowledges that recognize the intersectional
identities of victims of partner violence, we must be prepared for an
ever shifting field of study and thus, unstable “population”
characteristics. Contrary to Kohlberg’s universalist virtues, we argue
that virtues, too, are engendered in communities and are grounded in
particular times and locations. Without detracting from the importance
of literature reviews, part of a reflexive and relational practice must
account for the fluidity of identity. We argue that it is untenable at
best, to quantifiably rank said characteristics to form vulnerability
classifications. Instead, these countless contingencies and complexities
ought to be embraced and reflected in research projects and designs
and can be assessed in part by the literature, practice communities,
and field experiences of both research participants and researchers
(e.g., Campbell 2002; Campbell et al. 2009). Finally, we briefly return
to Clark and Walker’s concerns about the role of scientific journals and
how they directly bear upon the ethical outcomes and the practice of
care. Clark and Walker point to barriers to publication on partner
violence in high impact and mainstream journals (pp. 27-28). This
issue also extends beyond the research environment to larger practice
communities. The positionality and biography of the researcher plays a
central role in the final text (analysis, interpretation, evaluation) and
dissemination of research. How will participants be represented? Who
will receive the information and in what form? Approaching such
questions from a care ethics framework adds an additional layer. Who
likely engages in the practice of care and justice with victims of
partner violence? The practice of giving and receiving care – whether
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we consider research, publication, education or service – is not
gender-neutral. The dissemination of “care” research then closely
accords with wider care practices and can be more deeply challenged
along these lines. We invite researchers to use explicitly gendered and
structural frameworks to explore journal hierarchies and information
dissemination strategies.

Conclusion
Clark and Walker have issued a worthwhile challenge to all
researchers to widen the lens of research ethics in our work with
victims of violence. Lest it seem that we are advocating the
substitution of one ethical lens, that of virtue ethics, with another, that
of care ethics, we suggest that no single ethical tradition is sufficient to
the task of maintaining high ethical standards for research conduct.
These tools, for one, come to us from philosophy, whereas we are
functioning in the world of ideas as well as in our own complex lifeworlds and those of our research participants. We view these
participants as legitimate stakeholders within these research
processes—the studies we publish are accountable to their critiques
and understandings. When we purport to study victimization, we must
consider the intersubjective construction of the category “victim”—this
imperative is both to the benefit of our ethical standards as well as our
research standards. To suspect the victim of violence as possessing a
compromised capacity to consent is deeply problematic, again from
both an epistemological and an ethical standard. Finally, sustained
contact with research participants enables more accountability and
allows for longitudinal scrutiny of the research object as well as
research findings. Such regard for our research participants and the
incorporation of ethnographic methodology, as well as interdisciplinary
collaboration, will help us avoid epistemic violence. While we may
never come to perfect solutions in our desire to attain high standards
of ethical conduct, we can at least do as Das (1998) asks and give our
research participants the benefit of our deliberate hesitation as we
engage in the enterprise of research.
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i

Vir is Latin for man. Virtue indicated qualities of manliness. In the
Aristotelian tradition, all free males had the potential to become
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virtuous. Though the contemporary concept of virtue theory has
drifted away from Aristotle’s roots, its predisposition towards
masculine ideals is part of its genealogy.
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